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DEMOCRACY 
IN JAPAN:
From Meiji to MacArthur
Untitled 
(detail) 
Kathryn Stevens
Democracy in Japan has its 
roots in the international 
environment, rather than 
processes endogenous to the 
country itself. Prior to the 
1850s, Japan’s feudal system 
was both shut off from the 
international environment 
and self-sustaining. Over the 
next several decades, however, 
Japanese elites initiated an 
intense period of modernization 
in response to Western 
imperialism, unintentionally 
opening the country to liberal 
ideas. Although Japan slid 
back into authoritarianism 
in the 1930s, the American 
occupation thoroughly 
transformed its society 
 and completed the country’s 
transition to democracy. by Jacob Kennon
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Introduction
T he transformation of Japan from an authoritarian im-perialist to a democratic pacifist in world affairs is one of the most remarkable 
transitions of the last century. Until the 
middle of the nineteenth century Japanese 
society was utterly feudal, agricultural and 
decentralized. Although a military shogun 
exercised a certain degree of direct control 
over a host of vassals and an emperor was 
at least a nominal supreme ruler, most 
Japanese had little exposure to the world 
outside the land they rented and farmed. 
For such a closed, traditional society to 
radically transform itself into the mod-
ernized, industrial war machine which 
burst into Asia at the start of the twentieth 
century was a stunning accomplishment. 
Political and social upheaval underpinned 
this modernization at every turn and for 
a time produced stirrings of democracy in 
the wider current of authoritarianism.
 Although it is tempting to explain the 
Japanese experience with democracy prior 
to 1945 through a simple lens of modern-
ization theory or other factors internal to 
Japanese society, those explanations fall 
short.1 Japan’s feudal system was quite sta-
ble prior to the 1850s, when Western gun-
boat diplomacy finally forced the country 
to open its borders to foreign trade. It was 
only in response to the overwhelming 
threat that the West’s modern arms and 
organization posed to the nation’s integ-
rity that Japanese elites instigated what 
Barrington Moore Jr. appropriately termed 
a “revolution from above.”2 Without an 
external impetus for change, and an exter-
nal environment from which to draw new 
ideas and technology, Japan was unlikely 
to have experienced anything remotely 
close to the modernization and social un-
rest it went through in the seventy years 
prior to the start of what Japanese call the 
Fifteen-Year War (WWII). Moreover, the 
country certainly would not have democ-
ratized in the wake of its devastating de-
feat in that war without the all-important 
presence of U.S. occupation forces and the 
total restructuring of Japanese society they 
crafted. In this paper I argue that Japan’s 
relationship with its external environment 
drove each of the country’s democratic 
transitions: the Meiji Restoration of 1868-
1912, the development of “Taisho Democ-
racy” in the interwar years, the lapse into 
authoritarianism in the 1930s and the 
post-war consolidation.
The Transition From Feudalism
Japan’s transition from feudalism can be 
broadly understood through a construc-
tivist, ideational diffusion model along 
the lines proposed by Weyland, wherein 
domestic actors import external institu-
tional structures and social norms they 
find appealing. These foreign structures, 
however, are sometimes misunderstood 
by the importers or not well-suited for 
superimposition over their society. Fre-
quently, there are unintended knock-on 
effects with negative outcomes.3 Although 
Weyland focuses on the Latin American 
experience of importing democratic in-
stitutions explicitly, the core point of his 
analysis rings true for the Japanese experi-
ment in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century: foreign institutional structures 
did not work as intended because domestic 
prerequisites were absent. Japanese elites 
sought to import the elements of Western 
primacy without upsetting Japan’s inter-
nal power structure but did not pick and 
choose among them. As a consequence, 
over time they not only imported indus-
trialization and armament but notions of 
liberalism and democracy. These notions 
were only planted in the nineteenth cen-
tury, however; it took decades for the so-
cial foundations, such as political liberties 
and the moderation of conflict, to develop 
organically. Throughout this early modern 
period (1868-1912) Japan experienced a 
slow, steady erosion of the old order caused 
by constant self-exposure to Western 
ideas.
 Japanese elites in the 1850s and 60s 
struggled to decide whether or not to im-
port western technology and models of 
military organization to counter the exis-
tential threat posed by the imperial pow-
ers. An inter-elite struggle over this issue 
pitted a coalition of feudal lords against 
the shogun, the last ruler of the Tokugawa 
regime which had been in power continu-
ously since it unified the country in 1600.  
The central regime opposed building a 
national military. Arming the peasants 
would allow them be used by fiefs to chal-
lenge the government’s authority, and the 
peasants themselves could rebel as well. 
Both outcomes were expected to severely 
destabilize the feudal structure. The op-
position, while keenly aware of the pos-
sibility of peasant revolts, felt that it was a 
necessary risk given that the alternative to 
modernization was to succumb to western 
dominance. In 1868, after a civil war and 
under the pretense of restoring power to 
the imperial throne and its occupant, the 
emperor Meiji, the modernizers defeated 
the anciene regime, marking the start of 
what came to be known as the Meiji Resto-
ration. The fiefs they did not defeat directly 
they bought out, in essence striking the 
kind of pacts one would expect to see in 
an O’Donnell-Schmitter-style transition.4 
As it consolidated and gained bargaining 
leverage, the new regime gradually renego-
tiated these pacts with the last representa-
tives of the old order, who ceased to have 
an effect on politics after a final spasm in 
the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877.5
 The new regime immediately initiated 
a modernization campaign, seeking to 
secure Japan’s place as a sovereign state in 
the international order, while preserving 
as much of the old feudal structure as pos-
sible. The elites’ modernization program 
had unintended consequences, however. 
Economic development was imported 
wholesale and imposed on society—the 
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overwhelmingly rural population began 
to move into the cities to labor in indus-
try and the old, static social order came 
under stress. Imported economic reforms 
brought with them the same social stresses 
western countries faced when they un-
derwent their own industrializations. The 
concentration of people in the cities rede-
fined how social classes interacted with 
each other and a public sphere indepen-
dent of the state began to develop, contain-
ing new social groupings with their own 
preferences. Japanese oligarchs inadver-
tently fed this growth by importing liberal 
social and legal norms, assuming them 
to be a core part of the Western recipe for 
success. All barriers to associational life 
were removed and, in a radical change, 
the hereditary status system was abolished 
and all Japanese became equal before the 
law. Commercial societies, educational 
academies, and common interest groups 
cropped up and began to give at least the 
well-to-do strata of society a social iden-
tity which was no longer tied up in the 
old feudal structures. Newspapers, which 
had never developed under the Tokugawa 
regime, exploded, and by 1889 there were 
647 in print, 164 of which covered current 
events, including, critically, politics. De-
bating societies sprang up, the most prom-
inent of which, the Meirokusha (Sixth Year 
of Meiji Society), counted among its mem-
bers civil servants as well as members of 
the growing urban civil society and pub-
lished a periodical widely read by the intel-
ligentsia. One result of the elite’s newfound 
interest in foreign ideas was an influx of 
the classic liberal texts of the enlighten-
ment. The works of Mill, Locke, Spencer, 
Bentham and Rousseau were translated 
and began to circulate widely among both 
wealthy rural circles and the urban elite, 
giving rise to the Freedom and Popular 
Rights movement, which in 1880 gathered 
a quarter-million signatures demanding 
the creation of a national assembly.6
 Japanese elites had difficulty separating 
out western industrialization from the lib-
eral norms with which it tended to come 
packaged. Where they saw the physical 
means needed to challenge western pre-
eminence, growing business interests saw 
parliamentary political processes which 
could allow their voices to be heard in rul-
ing circles, and a burgeoning labor move-
ment saw the possibility of unionization as 
a counterweight to the squalid conditions 
in factories and cities. The Meiji constitu-
tion, crafted by imperial advisers and en-
acted by the Emperor in 1889 as a “gift to 
the people,” was a response to this growing 
pressure, despite the concept of a state 
organized by a written constitution being 
itself a Western concept. The constitution 
gave in to bourgeois demands for represen-
tation in government by creating the Diet 
(parliament) in which outsiders could gain 
seats and be heard, while still reserving the 
bulk of decision making authority for the 
Emperor and his cabinet.7 Moreover, the 
Diet was divided into two chambers, only 
one of which was filled via elections (by a 
small subset of wealthy males). The other 
was the equivalent of England’s House of 
Lords, its seats filled by elites with heredi-
tary status. This political arrangement al-
lowed for the formation of the first opposi-
tion party, the Liberals, around the turn of 
the century, which promptly began passing 
bills in the lower chamber to remove all 
remaining restrictions on freedom of asso-
ciation and assembly. The efforts went no-
where, however: the upper chamber could 
see the serious challenges to aristocratic 
power those measures would posses if al-
lowed to snowball and exercised a de facto 
veto over further political reform through 
legislation.8
 These reforms and others, which can be 
seen as incremental steps in the process of 
democratization, were able to take root in 
Japanese society for a variety of reasons. 
First, notions such as parliaments, and 
freedoms of association and assembly of-
fered both prescriptive concreteness and 
plausibility; newly minted Japanese liber-
als traveled to the West and saw that the 
ideas were more than just theory, they 
could work in practice, and all that was re-
quired was a clear-cut set of rules. Second, 
ordinary Japanese were increasingly liter-
ate, and the advent of newspapers offered a 
means for rapidly transmitting new ideas 
across society. Third, the basic content of 
these reforms was universalist—ideas such 
as individual liberty made no pretense of 
being solely for Western peoples.
 From 1889 to the end of the Meiji era in 
1912, Japan could reasonably fit into Hale’s 
conceptualization of a “hybrid regime,” 
one which is neither fully authoritarian 
nor democratic, but is relatively stable.9 
While a parliament with an active opposi-
tion existed, important decisions were still 
made at the executive and cabinet levels. 
Moreover, participation in the democratic 
process was reserved for just a small sub-
set of the population, only a few hundred 
thousand citizens out of tens of millions.10 
To the extent that there was real political 
competition, it was confined to infight-
All barriers to associational life were 
removed and, in a radical change, the 
hereditary status system was abolished 
and all Japanese became equal before  
the law. 
ing among elites and was not sufficient to 
warrant classifying Japan as democratic; 
however, given the open presence of liberal 
ideas in the public discourse of the time, 
it would also be inaccurate to describe the 
regime as purely authoritarian. It was a 
hybrid system and a relatively long-lived 
one at that.
Taisho Democracy And Its Rever-
sal
The period 1918-31, known as the Taisho 
Democracy, marked Japan’s most robust 
democratic experiment prior to the post-
war Occupation. Industrialization had 
spawned a growing labor movement which 
pressed its demands for rights and reform 
through the Diet, and a growing popula-
tion, itself a byproduct of modernization, 
required immense resources to sustain. 
As a country with very little arable land, 
minerals, and other raw materials, Japan 
increasingly had to look beyond its bor-
ders for critical resources and began to 
come into conflict with its better-endowed 
neighbors. Wars against China (1894-5) 
and Russia (1904-5), coupled with the an-
nexation of Korea (1910) placed tremen-
dous demands on industrial production 
and imposed harsh conditions on the 
working class, but also began to change 
the character of the state itself. By neces-
sity the state had to become more authori-
tarian in its organization, and this mili-
tarism spilt out into the domestic arena. 
Organized labor posed a threat to the 
state’s war making capacity, particularly 
when its strikes and protests disrupted 
production, so as events like the massive 
Rice Riots of 1918 became increasingly 
common in the 1920s, the government be-
gan to crack down and impose ever stricter 
controls on society.11
 Mark Pietrzyk, summarizing Otto 
Hintze, presents an applicable model for 
understanding this period of Japanese 
democratization.12 The model explains the 
process of democratization as a struggle 
between authoritarian and associational 
principles of organization, where the 
former governs the military realm and 
the latter civil society relationships. “An 
executive authority and a supporting 
military-security bureaucracy are cre-
ated by society for purposes of successful 
war-making. The executive authority must 
of necessity employ hierarchical and co-
ercive methods in order to mobilize and 
lead for war…,” writes Pietrzk. “At the 
same time, members of society may have 
relations with each other with minimal 
intervention by the state.”13 According to 
Pietrzk, a country can only move towards 
democracy if the associational principle of 
organization is predominant in its social 
relations. Internal conditions, such as the 
presence and credibility of democratic 
ideas, the intensity of national unity, level 
of economic development, the presence of 
an independent bourgeoisie, a large middle 
class, or previous experience with democ-
racy have all been shown to strengthen 
associational ties and pave the way for de-
mocratization. Pietrzyk argues, however, 
that the critical permissive condition is an 
external one: a country can only democra-
tize if it is at peace with its neighbors. The 
extent to which the authoritarian principle 
is strengthened vis-a-vis the associational 
is directly linked to the level of demands 
placed on the state to defend the integrity 
of the country. The more frequently the 
state is at war, the more likely it is to be-
come centralized, militarized and coercive 
in its character.
 This model fits Taisho Japan well. Dur-
ing the Meiji Restoration and the early 
part of the twentieth century Japan had 
remained relatively at peace with its neigh-
bors (with the exception of the conflicts 
noted above). As a consequence, domestic 
forces unleashed by modernization and 
the diffusion of liberal western ideas were 
given room to take root and began push-
ing the government to democratize. Over 
time, however, the pendulum began to 
swing the other direction.
The Development Of The State
The origins of the Japanese state as it exists 
today can be traced back to the late Meiji 
era, the end of the nineteenth century, and 
are best understood through the lens of 
Porter’s War and the Rise of the Nation-
State.14 Japan’s modernization can be seen 
as an induced response to the threat of 
western power, and the organization of 
the modern state was a parallel develop-
ment. According to Porter, we should 
expect to see countries go through roughly 
three phases in response to the threat of 
war.15 First, a kind of “proto-nationalism” 
takes hold, causing previously disparate 
groups within the nation to begin to see 
themselves as part of a larger, unified pol-
ity. They begin to form a distinct national 
identity to contrast themselves with their 
potential enemies. The state begins to take 
on a modern form in response to demands 
for the institutions and bureaucracy re-
quired to wage war on a large scale. Sec-
ond, military service (required or volun-
tary) integrates geographically dispersed 
members of society and further reinforces 
nationalist sentiment. In many cases there 
is a call to serve a higher purpose, such as 
Japan’s modernization can be seen as an 
induced response to the threat of western 
power, and the organization of the modern 
state was a parallel development. 
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the French Revolution’s cry for Liberté, 
égalité, fraternité. In Porter’s final phase, 
nationalism boils over into aggression 
and the phenomenon of Total War takes 
hold.16 This model goes a long way towards 
explaining the development of the heavily 
centralized Japanese government which 
eventually planted the seeds of its own de-
mise in the 1930s.
 Prior to the Meiji Restoration, the 
Tokugawa regime was remarkably stable 
and ran Japan by devolving most respon-
sibilities to the feudal lords under its 
influence. With virtually no contact with 
the outside world, there was no need to 
create the level of government bureaucracy 
required to field a modern army. Once it 
became evident that without thorough 
modernization the country would soon be 
overrun by the West, the elites who came 
to power in 1868 embarked on the task 
of creating a state capable of meeting the 
challenge. Throughout the Meiji period the 
new state solidified, tying the once dispa-
rate fiefs together into a Japan with a single 
national identity in opposition to that of 
the West. For a time, this emerging state 
was able to both gather authority in the 
central government even as it let some of it 
go into the hands of parliament, especially 
in the Taisho era. As the organizational 
pressure of waging Total War abroad grew, 
however, the state came to dominate both 
the economy and civil society and an ero-
sion of democracy took place up through 
the 1945 surrender.
 Smith provides one framework for 
understanding the driver of this Japa-
nese expansionism when he describes 
21
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the economic order that emerged during 
the 1930s as neomercantalist. The giant 
industrial and financial conglomerates 
(zaibatsu) which evolved as Japan indus-
trialized became increasingly interwoven 
with the state and relied on it to open up 
foreign markets. The impressive economic 
performance of this arrangement provided 
a way for the conservative ruling elite to 
claim legitimacy, even as it defended “what 
appeared to be an increasingly autarchic 
domestic economy.”17 Domestic liberals, 
while they gained a measure of decision 
making power via the parliament through-
out the Taisho era were too weakly orga-
nized to effectively shape public opinion or 
balance against the overwhelming influ-
ence of the state and military in domestic 
politics. Despite their inability to pull the 
country back from the warpath, however, 
the liberals were hardly a fringe voice and 
openly criticized the conservative ruling 
establishment. Smith notes that as late as 
1936, one party received a plurality of the 
vote campaigning on the slogan, “Will it 
be parliamentary democracy or fascism?”18
The Initial Phase Of Occupation 
With its defeat and unconditional surren-
der in the fall of 1945, Japan offered itself 
up to the mercy of its American occupiers. 
What followed was one of the most auda-
cious attempts at societal transformation 
ever made by a victor in war. The Ameri-
can Occupation forces under General 
McArthur were explicit in their goal: pac-
ify Japan so that it would never again em-
bark on a war of conquest and accomplish 
that goal reform and democratization.19 
The American initiatives in the early phase 
of the Occupation can be seen as direct 
intellectual descendents of Wilsonianism 
coupled with New Deal era pragmatism. 
At the core of Wilsonian theory is the 
proposition that the most legitimate gov-
ernments in the eyes of both domestic and 
international audiences are those which 
derive their authority from the consent 
of the governed. An international order 
comprised of such democratic states and 
supported by a liberal economic regime, 
collective security, and mutual respect for 
the self-determination of peoples will be 
inherently peaceful. In such an order, any 
state which violates the sovereignty of an-
other necessarily commits an illegitimate, 
economically damaging, and militarily 
foolish act.20 Reformers in the occupation 
believed that if they could bring Japan 
into the democratic club it would not only 
make the region more secure but would be 
a noble thing unto itself.
 The idea of democratizing Japan from 
without, while idealistic, was not an ut-
terly far-fetched proposition. As discussed 
above, the country had at least modest 
prior experience with democracy, a fact 
which seems to have eluded the many 
contemporary American “experts” on the 
Japan who were skeptical of the Occupa-
tion’s enterprise.21 Democracy in the inter-
war years served as an important histori-
cal reference point for domestic Japanese 
actors, some of whom included the very 
liberals, socialists, and communists who 
opposed the ascendance of authoritarian-
ism in the 1930s. Lack of historical insight 
notwithstanding, however, McArthur and 
his circle were confident on the basics of 
what they thought had to be done to pro-
duce enduring democracy: every person 
who ran or profited from the war was to 
be purged from public life and the societal 
interests which had pushed for expansion 
in the first place were to be eliminated. The 
Occupation assumed that as long as these 
actors and interests existed, democracy 
had little chance of taking hold in the long 
run. 
 First and foremost, blame for the war 
fell on the military, and a series of tribu-
nals were convened as soon as the war 
ended. These trials were an integral part of 
the demilitarization of Japanese society. As 
the Americans saw it, they removed, quite 
literally, the most egregious offenders from 
the social equation. When the victor’s 
justice was said and done, 5,700 so-called 
Class B/C “war criminals,” a new term at 
the time, were indicted, of whom roughly 
920 were executed and 475 received life 
sentences.22 Of the top-level Class A crimi-
nals sentenced in the Tokyo trial (widely 
regarded as a showcase, despite meticulous 
attention to procedural detail on part of 
the prosecution), seven were hanged, six-
teen imprisoned for life, and five died in 
prison; however, many more were either 
paroled, or later granted clemency after 
the occupation ended.23 In addition to 
purging most of the top military and civil-
ian leadership, the Occupation eliminated 
the basic war material of the armed forces, 
destroying munitions, planes, tanks, and 
weapons on a huge scale.24
 Second on the American reform agenda 
was the economy. The landlord class, 
which had been a key constituency aligned 
with the old regime, was explicitly targeted 
through an “agrarian land reform” policy 
and within a few years had been almost 
entirely disposed of its holdings, creating 
Reformers in the occupation believed 
that if they could bring Japan into the 
democratic club it would not only make the 
region more secure but would be a noble 
thing unto itself.
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a huge class of small farmers on its former 
estates which were presumed be more 
receptive to democratic governance.25 
In addition, a policy of “deconcentra-
tion” was targeted at the family-owned 
zaibatsu holding companies, which the 
Americans regarded as war profiteers 
and a primary interest group opposed to 
democratization. By the end of the war, 
the top ten zaibatsu had gained control 
of almost half the capital in the mining, 
machinery, shipbuilding and chemical 
industries; half of the capital in the bank-
ing sector; and sixty percent of both the 
insurance and shipping industries.26 These 
industrial-political elites had every reason 
to be actively opposed to democratization 
in the aftermath of the war. The political 
freedoms of speech, and assembly the Oc-
cupation put in place immediately granted 
immense legitimacy and political cover to 
the conglomerates’ domestic opponents: a 
unionization movement, radical and mod-
erate socialist parties, and, most threaten-
ing, a newly-legal and resurgent Japanese 
Communist Party. All three had origins 
dating back to the era of Taisho Democ-
racy and were either actively supported by 
the American reformers, as was the case 
with the labor movement, or were at least 
not initially seen as a threat in the case of 
the latter two.27 Over time, however, the 
tolerance of the Americans for the radical-
ism of these movements grew thin, a point 
to be returned to below, and for a variety 
of other reasons a cozier relationship de-
veloped between the occupying forces, the 
zaibatsu, and the remnants of the conser-
vative political establishment. By the time 
the Occupation ended, only a handful of 
the immense number of zaibatsu origi-
nally targeted for breakup actually ended 
up being disintegrated.28
 Conspicuously absent from the Ameri-
can reform agenda was the Japanese state 
itself, specifically the bureaucracy. Since 
the Meiji era the central bureaucracy had 
played a major role in Japanese life, man-
aging everything from near-universal 
education, to infrastructure, to economic 
planning. By the time of the American 
occupation, it was an interest group unto 
itself and could reasonably have been ac-
cused of helping to perpetrate the war. The 
Occupation forces, however, one did not 
conceptualize the bureaucracy as an actor 
in society. Working from an American 
administrative tradition predicated on 
the ideal of purely technical, command 
and control systems of management, U.S. 
personal had no basis in experience for 
understanding the central role and initia-
tive the bureaucracy had taken in Japan’s 
earlier development. Rather, they saw it as 
a tool wielded by other interests, such as 
the emperor, military, zaibatsu, and now 
the occupiers. By the time Japan formally 
regained its sovereignty after the Occu-
pation, the bureaucracy had grown sub-
stantially in relative power vis-à-vis other 
domestic groups and was set to regain its 
guiding role in society.29
 The crowning achievement of the Oc-
cupation was without a doubt the newly 
drafted Japanese constitution. Written by 
McArthur and a close circle of advisors, 
it included virtually every democratic 
safeguard and political freedom ever 
conceived of in the West. Among many 
things, the constitution expanded the 
franchise to include all men and women, 
established a clearly defined bicameral 
parliament which appointed the prime 
minister, and wrote into law a renuncia-
tion of Japan’s sovereign right to wage war 
(the world-unique Article 9). The only ves-
tige of the Meiji constitution of 1889 was 
the Emperor himself, who was relegated 
to a ceremonial role in the state. Despite 
much backroom protest debate from the 
highest officials of the nominal Japanese 
government, the constitution was translat-
ed into Japanese virtually verbatim from 
its original English with only a few minor 
amendments permitted.30 With the formal 
adoption of the constitution in 1947, Ja-
pan, at least on paper, transitioned to full 
democracy.
The Occupation’s “Reverse 
Course”
An important theoretical lens through 
which to view the Occupation, both in its 
initial and later phase, lies in the transi-
tions framework presented by O’Donnell 
and Schmitter. In their model, one com-
mon route to democracy lies through 
defeat in an international conflict followed 
by occupation by a country which is itself 
a political democracy. A factor which en-
hances the odds of a successful transition 
is the presence of what they refer to as a 
“preauthoritarian legacy,” meaning the 
remnants of old institutions, political par-
ties, civil society groups, and others who 
can help revive a prior political system. 
Factors which push against a successful 
transition to democracy include interest 
groups willing to launch coups against a 
new government, and existence of past 
“scores to settle” between competing fac-
tions.31 O’Donnell and Schmitter cite other 
possible countervailing factors, but those 
shed less light on the Japanese case than 
the ones mentioned. Critical, however, is 
their conceptualization of “pact-making” 
among interest groups jockeying for posi-
tion during an uncertain transition.32
With the formal adoption of the constitution 
in 1947, Japan, at least on paper, 
transitioned to full democracy.
 As discussed above, immediately upon 
the arrival of the occupiers Japan’s preau-
thoritarian legacy was revived by leftist so-
cial and labor movements eager to exercise 
long repressed political voices and push 
for representation. With the U.S. pushing a 
democratization agenda and actively gut-
ting the military complex, there was little 
to stand in their way. Japan faced a some-
what unique situation in that there was not 
the slightest chance of an anti-democratic 
coup taking place on the Americans’ 
watch, so while the extent to which the 
country would be forced to democratize 
was anyone’s guess, it became clear to 
most actors early on that the political sys-
tem was opening up. With conservatives in 
all areas (political, military, economic) in 
retreat and revived preauthoritarian, pro-
democratic groups in the wings, Japan’s 
democratic consolidation seemed all but 
certain in the Occupation’s early years.
 By 1948, however, the situation was 
beginning to change. The breakdown of 
the victorious alliance and the emergence 
of the Soviet Union as a rival to the United 
States began to push aside Wilsonian 
aspirations for the dawn of a peaceful, 
democratic era in East Asia. For a number 
of reasons, the Occupation embarked on a 
“reverse course,” drastically scaling down 
the economic “deconcentration” program 
which was set to break up the zaibatsu 
en masse and backpedaling on politi-
cal liberties. First, influential American 
policymakers, notably Under Secretary of 
the Army William H. Draper, Jr., began to 
question the wisdom of tearing down Ja-
pan’s industrial economy and war-making 
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capacity in the face of the mounting Soviet 
threat. The U.S. was not only spending 
massive quantities of money aiding Japan 
while simultaneously threatening its core 
industries with dismemberment, but was 
suddenly finding itself in need of a strong 
East Asian bulwark against communism. 
Second, the outbreak of the Korean war 
abruptly created enormous demand for 
Japanese industrial goods, at once infusing 
cash into the zaibatsu and making them 
a lynchpin in the American war effort.33 
Finally, on the domestic front, ongoing 
demonstrations and strikes (reminiscent 
of Japan’s experience during World War 
I) by unions and leftists of all stripes, 
including communist, pressured by the 
slow pace of the post-war recovery prior to 
the Korean conflict, began act more mili-
tantly and draw the ire of the authorities. 
A cycle ensued, wherein each new level of 
radicalism on the left further alienated the 
Americans, who then cranked up repres-
sion and became more sympathetic to the 
remaining civilian old guard.34
 As the Occupation wore on in these 
later years, the Americans began to be-
have increasingly like just another interest 
group in the country. Yes, ultimate deci-
sion making power still rested at the point 
of their guns, but the desire to extricate 
themselves from running the country put 
them in the position of having to cut deals 
(make pacts) with other actors that would 
have been inconceivable in 1945. The final 
arrangements can be characterized suc-
cinctly: first, the U.S. traded economic 
reform for an industrialized, if cartelized, 
Japan capable of anchoring East Asian se-
curity; second, the Occupation authorities 
quietly allowed the rehabilitation of the 
old-guard conservative politicians in ex-
change for the assurance that Japan would 
not succumb to domestic social move-
ments and drift into the communist bloc. 
The end result was Japan which democ-
ratized only part way, retaining a sound, 
liberal constitution up to the present, but 
never developing the kind of robust politi-
cal competition characterized by frequent 
turnovers of power. Up until the 1990s, a 
single conservative party, the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ) was in government 
continuously. It would not be an exaggera-
tion to say, then, that perhaps the most 
enduring Occupation legacy in Japan is 
that of polyarchy; a small political and 
economic elite cycles its members through 
power continuously within the confines of 
an otherwise thoroughly liberal constitu-
tion.
Conclusion
Japan’s modern experience with democ-
racy has been defined at all stages by the 
country’s relationship with external forces. 
From its initial opening at the point of a 
gun in the mid-nineteenth century, to its 
induced “revolution from above” in the 
Meiji era, Japan was playing catch up to 
the West. As it modernized and domestic 
forces began to push for democracy, the 
old order started to slowly erode, with the 
Meiji Constitution, and the expansion of 
political liberties in the interwar years be-
ing major milestones. The pressures of war 
forged the efficient, bureaucratized state 
still present today, while at the same time 
producing a backslide into totalitarian-
ism in the 1930s as the democracy’s key 
permissive condition, peace, was removed. 
The American Occupation explicitly en-
gaged in a democratization process and 
was quite successful, but the realities of 
real politick at the dawn of the Cold War 
necessitated a return of sovereignty to 
some of the very actors responsible for 
the horrors of World War II. Japan today, 
while certainly worthy of being called a 
democracy, possesses a political system 
characterized by polyarchy and a clear lack 
of institutionalized political competition.
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